Javna diplomatija moskve i rusofilstvo u Srbiji 2012–2019.
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18485/Ključne reči:
Rusofilstvo, Rusija, Srbija, javna diplomatija, meka sila, politike pamćenjaApstrakt
Rusofilstvo u Srbiji nije nova pojava. Ipak, njegov prividan porast posljednjih godina postao je „vruća tema“ i među politolozima i među entuzijastima. U ovom radu autor nastoji da identifikuje niz proruskih aktivnosti javne diplomatije u Srbiji i njene glavne aktere. Glavni zadatak je da se utvrdi da li je Moskva zapravo glavni katalizator spomenutog fenomena ili postoje i drugi važni faktori. Da bismo svojoj analizi dali teorijsko utemeljenje poslužićemo se konceptualnim okvirom Džozefa Naja i Nikolasa Kala.
Reference
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