Igra uveravanja u velikim grupama– ekonomski primeri

Autori

  • Dušan Pavlović Univerzitet u Beogradu Fakultet političkih nauka Author

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18485/

Ključne reči:

fiskalni podsticaj, paradoks štednje, koordinacioni nedostaci, komplementarnost, kolektivno delanje, fiskalni stimulus, ravnoteža, državna intervencija

Apstrakt

U ovom tekstu primenjujem teoriju igara na ekonomske probleme u velikim grupama (više od dva igrača). Fokusiram se na problem koordinacije kolektivnog delanja unutar igre uveravanja. Koordinacioni nedostaci u nekoj kolektivnoj radnji proizvod su očekivanja o tome šta će uraditi druge osobe. Pesimizam o radnjama drugih stvara „lošu” ravnotežu, dok optimizam stvara „dobru” ravnotežu. Igru analiziram na tri primera: studentsko samoocenjivanje, fiskalni podsticaj i odsustvo investicija u nerazvijenim privredama. Glavni zaključak je da problem koordinacionih nedostataka može da se reši državnom intervencijom – fiskalnim podsticajima ili koordinacionim telom koje stvara fokalnu tačku za potrošače i proizvođače.

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2019-06-15

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