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The Segregation and/or Integration of Hezbollah as a Non-State Actor in beating the Scale of the Lebanese Government Regional Policy**

Abstract

The Shiite position before the Lebanese civil war differs significantly from the one after it. Through the war they were transformed from a marginalized group to compelling players on the Lebanese and regional political arena. The momentous reason behind the Shiite empowerment was the emergence of Hezbollah, which is backed by Iran. The relation between Hezbollah and the Lebanese government is decided by the controversial regional issues. The paper aims to investigate Hezbollah's ideology and so-called Lebanonization regarding Lebanese foreign policy. It demonstrates that Hezbollah is a rational non-state actor who is part of the regional comparative dynamics and power struggle. It argues that Hezbollah is a pragmatic ideology-driven actor which plays both cards of integration and segregation. The integration provides a refuge for Hezbollah while the segregation enables it to pursue its regional agenda. The method of discourse analysis is used in examining Hezbollah's ideology, governance and foreign policy.

Key words

Iranian issues, Hezbollah, non-state actorness foreign policymaking, regional complex, Middle East competition, Arab conflicts, ideology

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INTRODUCTION

The emergence of Hezbollah as an influential non-state actor (NSA) at the domestic, regional, and international level resulted from several factors. Hezbollah emerged with the beginning of globalization, which brought free market that eased the flow of arms deal providing Hezbollah with the weapons needed.¹

Regionally, after the Islamic Revolution was established in Iran, the plan of exporting it started. Lebanon appealed as a free and prepared ground. Consequently, Iran began to offer ideological and material support for the Lebanese Shiite.²

Domestically, the leading cause for the appearance of Hezbollah on the stage was the Israeli invasion in 1982. As Hezbollah Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah frames it: "We are a movement born as a reaction to the occupation of part of our country."³

The complexity of Hezbollah starts from its definition. Characterizing this group depends intensely on the indicator. Hezbollah is a social welfare organization, a social movement, a political party, a participant in government, a resistance force, a militia and a terrorist group.⁴ However, following the article's argument, Hezbollah is regarded as a non-state actor with an armed fraction.

In an age of globalization, anxiety, instability, and violence, scholars realized the significance of NSAs on the national and international stage. They defined NSAs as a non-sovereign entity that exerts essential economic, political, or social power and impacts the political decisions and to some degree, the international rulings.⁵ NSAs have unpredictable means of response towards traditional state acts. Thus, the future of political relations in terms of

¹ Joshua L. Gleis and Benedetta Berti, *Hezbollah and Hamas: A Comparative Study*, The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2012, p. 37.

² Augustus Richard Norton, *Hezbollah A Short History*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2009, p. 34.

³ H. Nasrallah, interview by Nida al-Watan', 31 August 1993, in Nicholas Noe, *Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah*, Verso, Brooklyn, 2007, p. 127.

⁴ Samir Shalabi, *Hezbollah: Ideology, Practice, and the Arab Revolts Between Popular Legitimacy and Strategic Interest*, BA Thesis, Lund University, 2015, p. 7.

⁵ Rainer Baumann and Frank A. Stengel, "Foreign Policy Analysis, Globalisation, and Non-State Actors: State-Centric After All?", *Journal of International Relations and Development*, Vol.17, No. 4, pp. 489–521.

checks and balances will alter as NSAs begin playing on the stage.⁶ There are various types of NSAs, one of them being the violent non-state actors. VNSAs, to whom Hezbollah belongs in category, are recognized as primary reasons behind government volatility, civil unrest, wars, and general situations of uncertainty and hostility.⁷

In this attempt to understand the actorness of Hezbollah, the qualitative method of discourse analysis is used in examining the contents of sources. For Hezbollah's ideological stands, its officially published documents the 1985 *Open Letter* and the 2009 *New Manifesto* will be investigated.

This analysis focus on the discursive acting of Hezbollah vis-à-vis the Lebanese Foreign Policy towards the regional conflicts, mainly those between the Arab countries and Iran. It demonstrates the pragmatism of Hezbollah in its ideology and actions. leading claim is that Hezbollah follows two parallel lines concerning the Lebanese government the one of integration and the other of segregation. The analyzing covers three principled rationales that of ideology, governance, and foreign policy, each of which being core element in Hezbollah's performance.

THE PROGRESS OF HEZBOLLAH'S IDEOLOGY FROM "RELIGIOUS VISION" TO "PRACTICAL APPLICATION"

Hezbollah experienced noteworthy political and ideological alteration. Hezbollah witnessed three stages of transition in enacting its identity goals that of religious ideology, political ideology, and political agenda.⁸ However, there are immutable established principles.

Religious Ideology

Hezbollah main aim is "the establishment of an Islamic government."⁹ They declared, "We do not hide our commitment to the rule of Islam, we urge to

⁶ Ersel Aydinli, "Assessing Violent Non-State Actorness in Global Politics: A Framework for Analysis", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 242–444.

⁷ Diane E. Davis, "Non-State Armed Actors, New Imagined Communities, and Shifting Patterns of Sovereignty and Insecurity in the Modern World", *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 221–245.

⁸ Joseph Alagha, *Shifts in Hizbullah's Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program*, Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, 2006, p. 191.

⁹ Adham Souli, "Lebanon's Hizbullah: The Quest for Survival", *World Affairs*, Vol. 166, No. 2, pp. 71–80.

choose the Islamic system that alone guarantees justice and dignity for all."¹⁰ "We, the sons of Hizbullah's nation, whose vanguards God has given victory in Iran and which has established the nucleus of the world's central Islamic State abide by the orders of a single, wise and just command currently embodied in the supreme Ayatollah Ruhollah al-Musawi al-Khomeini."¹¹ With this declaration Hezbollah proved its links with Iran.

On the domestic level, Hezbollah purpose is "to abolish the abhorred sectarian discrimination and achieve justice among citizens."¹² The Israeli occupation of Lebanon boosted Hezbollah's political progress. It "speeded up the presence of Hizbullah as a struggle movement that is affiliated in the long complicated and complex fight against the Zionist enemy."¹³

Hezbollah's core believes known and embedded in their enactment; however, by entering the Lebanese arena, the party found itself in need of introducing some alterations. Hezbollah will learn that the complexities of Lebanon and the Middle East meant that amendments to its principles, or the way it pursues them, is inevitable. This issue will affect Hezbollah's political approach, where it will show both firmness and flexibility regarding its doctrines.

Political Ideology of Practical Application

By entering the political ideology period, Hezbollah relation with Iran seized to be blindfolded since Khomeini left for the party to choose the mean for applying what instructions he emphasized.¹⁴ When it comes to Hezbollah's stance on foreign policy, it followed those of Iran's of "No East, no West, rather only Islam."¹⁵ Hence, Hezbollah moved from xenophobia, which dominated its religious ideology to embracing Westoxification in the political phase.¹⁶

¹⁰ Augustus Richard Norton, *Amal, and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon*, op. cit., p. 172.

¹¹ Augustus Richard Norton, *Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon*, University of Texas, Texas, 1987, p. 173.

¹² Adham Souli, *Lebanon's Hizbullah: The Quest for Survival*, op. cit., pp. 71–80.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

¹⁴ Joseph Alagha, *Shifts in Hizbullah's Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program*, op. cit., p. 192.

¹⁵ Suzanne Maloney, "Identity and Change in Iran's Foreign Policy", in Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (eds.), *The Foreign Policy of Middle East States*. Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002, pp. 88–116.

¹⁶ Joseph Alagha, *Shifts in Hizbullah's Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program*, op. cit., p. 195.

Domestically, The Taif Accord in 1989 ended the 15 years of the civil war by amending the political system, particularly those elements that are related to the sectarian distribution in parliamentary seats and public administrations. Nasrallah stated that: "Opposition from within the government in its current form would not be a real opposition, and would produce nothing."¹⁷ Hezbollah was urging for a sweeping revolutionary change -through democratic conducts- to reach its aim of founding an Islamic system in Lebanon which will protect the Lebanese interests.¹⁸ It came to see that the way to preserve its political and social presence is through becoming part of the Lebanese structure and having a say in shaping Lebanon's future. Therefore, Hezbollah must move from segregation to integration.¹⁹ Thus, despite the intensive debate within its cadres, Hezbollah decided to enter the 1992 summer elections which were the first to be held since the eruption of the civil war.²⁰

Consequently, following its interest in the long term, Hezbollah decided to enter the Lebanese political system regardless of past accusations of being oppressive, corrupted and sectarian.²¹ Nonetheless, in entering the Lebanese political game, it did not leave its ideology behind. The formation of an Islamic state was and still its main aim. Nevertheless, Hezbollah opted not to mention it in any of the political events to distinguish its ideology from the political program.²² Accordingly, aiming for a secure and dominant position in the Lebanese political system, Hezbollah made room for pragmatism.²³

¹⁷ Hassan Nasrallah, "Interview by As-Safir, 27 February 1992", in: Nicholas Noe, *Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah*, Verso, Brooklyn, 2007, p. 74.

¹⁸ Hassan Nasrallah, "Interview by al- Watan al-Araby, 11 September 1992", in: Nicholas Noe, *Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah*, op. cit., p. 90-91.

¹⁹ Magnus Ranstorp, 'The strategy and tactics of Hezbollah's current Lebanonization process', *Mediterranean Politics*, vol 3., No. 1, pp. 103-134.

²⁰ Naim Qassem, *Hizbullah The Story from Within*, Saqi, London, 2010, pp. 313-20.

²¹ 'Open Letter Addressed to the Oppressed in Lebanon and the World', in: Joseph Alagha, *Hizbullah's Documents*, Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, 2011, p. 45.

²² Joseph Alagha, *Hizbullah's DNA and the Arab Spring*, KW Publishers Pvt Ltd, New Delhi, 2013, pp. xxv-xxvi.

²³ Mark Perry, 'Talking to terrorists: Hamas and Hezbollah', in: K. Yambert (ed.), *The contemporary Middle East*, 3rd ed., USA, Westview Press, 2013, p. 317.

THE POSITIONING OF HEZBOLLAH AS A NON-STATE ACTOR VIS-À-VIS THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT

Originally, Hezbollah was an advocate for a radical revolutionary regime change and refusing the idea of being an opposition within a corrupted system. However, its position shifted later where the party not only participated in the government but also, insisted on having veto power in the Cabinet. Thus, Hezbollah was moving from segregation to integration yet, according to its own terms rather than that of the government.

Opposing Government

Segregation was Hezbollah's first approach to the Lebanese government. It aimed to establish an Islamic state in Lebanon, following the Iranian project.²⁴

Hussein al-Musawi, a significant figure in the party's radical militant approach, illustrates the situation. He alleged: "We don't believe that the regime has a legitimate right to survive... since we assume that it is possible to overthrow this regime, we're using all the means at our disposal to make this regime illegal and powerless... we may not be able to overthrow it soon, yet we are not dissatisfied with our methods of overthrowing the regime."²⁵ He stated, "As Muslims, we don't believe in the existence of a separate country called Lebanon, we relate to the entire Islamic world as our homeland."²⁶ According to him, "We are ready to overthrow the regime in Lebanon to establish a just regime. Whoever rules over Lebanon must adhere to the laws of Islam. It doesn't matter to us whom the next President of Lebanon shall be, because we are not in the Lebanese regime." Hence, the problem is neither the President nor the government; instead, it is the grudging regime itself.²⁷

Conversely, Naim Qassem, the Deputy Secretary-General of Hezbollah, shows a lighter approach to the Lebanese political system. He asserted that the party refrained from participating in any political matter throughout its first years of initiation since such action might have averted the movement from endorsing the resistance.²⁸

As Hezbollah has its hostility towards the Lebanese government, the latter has its apprehensions regarding Hezbollah. The Lebanese government ac-

²⁴ Eitan Azani, *Hezbollah the Story of the Party of God*, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2011, p. 142.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

²⁸ Naim Qassem, *Hizbullah The Story from Within*, op. cit., pp. 139–140.

knowledges the danger which Hezbollah imposes on the stability of the country. Thus, the Lebanese state tried to limit Hezbollah's actions and moderate it as far as it can.²⁹ Hezbollah's ties with Iran and its conduct did not suit the government's interests.

The regime's conduct yielded when Hezbollah embarked on a new journey where an alteration to the policies and behavior took place. The most significant change was that of Hezbollah moving from opposition outside the political system to opposition from within it.³⁰

Participating in Governance

Hezbollah witnessed an intensive debate about whether to integrate or segregate from the government and whether the Iranian model is applicable in Lebanon. The Shiite prominent cleric, Fadlallah, asserted that the Lebanese political order and situation could not be compared to that in Iran.³¹ Therefore, a plan which suits the Lebanese particularity should be placed in action, since Hezbollah was functioning on the Lebanese stage, under constraints drawn by the regional and international system.³² Hence, Fadlallah urged Hezbollah to integrate into the Lebanese political system.³³

Hezbollah feared the Taif Agreement which brought an end to the civil war. For Hezbollah, a stable willing government is a danger to its very existence; thus, Hezbollah opposed the agreement. Meantime, Hezbollah kept talks going with the government and opening links with other Lebanese sects and political parties to integrate within the political structure.³⁴

Hezbollah's leading program on the local level aimed towards promoting and gathering support for the resistance movement from the Lebanese populace, the political figures, and parties. Therefore, the call for regime change fell low, and moderation seized the stage.³⁵ Hezbollah placed clear margins of maneuvering and red lines. Nasrallah said: "We...shall act to establish the internal security and the internal peace, and we shall make every effort to cast away the threatening shadow of a civil war."³⁶

²⁹ Eitan Azani, *Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God*, op. cit., p. 142.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 149.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 142.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 142.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

³⁴ Naim Qassem, *Hizbullah The Story from Within*, op. cit., pp. 152–53.

³⁵ Eitan Azani, *Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God*, op. cit., p. 151.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 152.

Government Participation

For Hezbollah, the aim from entering the Lebanese arena through the parliament was to enlarge its movement on the political stage, to influence the Lebanese government and secure the party's goals.³⁷ Hezbollah kept its independence and its maneuvering strategies, mainly when it comes to the struggle with Israel and the regional conflicts. This independence created problems for the Lebanese government. The regime felt weak regarding the power of Hezbollah and its use of violence, which inflicted instability on the domestic life and the ability of the government to spread its sovereignty.³⁸

Hezbollah ultimately was striving to secure a position in the highest stratum of the Lebanese political structure. The party appeared ready to alter its policies to work on employing the Lebanese system for its favor. By insisting on having veto power in the Cabinet, Hezbollah was stating that it wanted to control the Lebanese politics. In 2008, a military confrontation happened between Hezbollah and its adversaries after the cabinet refusal to grant Hezbollah its wishes. However, after its failure in 2008 clashes and 2009 parliamentary elections, it adhered to the results favoring a negligible role over the danger of displacing the Lebanese delicate confessional system.³⁹ It was clear that the party realized the importance of adjusting to the fluctuating social and political environments.⁴⁰

It is evident that the Lebanese regime could not have a say with Hezbollah and failed to maneuver it towards the Lebanese interests. Hezbollah kept its agenda and strived towards achieving it with internal and external support. The Lebanese government opted for exercising a supple policy, on one hand standing with Hezbollah as a resistance movement and on the other striving to limit its intrigues.⁴¹

³⁷ Eitan Azani, *Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God*, op. cit., p. 157.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 172.

³⁹ Joseph Alagha, *Hizbullah's DNA and the Arab Spring*, op. cit., pp. xxvi-xxvii.

⁴⁰ Samir Shalabi, *Hezbollah: Ideology, Practice, and the Arab Revolts Between Popular Legitimacy and Strategic Interest*, op. cit., p. 18.

⁴¹ Eitan Azani, *Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God*, op. cit., p. 173.

HEZBOLLAH AS A NON-STATE ACTOR DEFINING LEBANESE GOVERNMENT FOREIGN POSITION

Lebanon never had a coherent foreign policy due to the internal fragmentations and external interference.⁴² Domestically, the sub-state actors and their alliance with regional and international power weakened the government and kept the system fragile unable and sometimes unwilling to make crucial decisions.⁴³ Externally, the conflicts in the Middle East with their International dimension leaves Lebanon with uncertain policies.⁴⁴ Hence, the government, by taking decisions mainly regarding the Arab conflicts and Iranian issues, finds itself confronting at least one of the actors on the Lebanese stage. In the heat of the recent Gulf conflicts with Iran, clashes between the Lebanese government and Hezbollah surfaced.

Government Position

Saudi Arabia's King called for an urgent Arab League Summit which came after the clashes between Iran and KSA.⁴⁵ The Summit denounced the Iranian intervention in the Syrian war, its role in the civil unrest in Bahrain, its support for the Houthis in Yemen and the acts of vandalism on the Gulf shores. Iraq objected to the decisions of the summit primarily those that have to do with Iran stating that "Iran is a neighboring country and we should preserve its security." Lebanon did not protest the conclusion of the summit; instead, it braced the Arab consensus.⁴⁶

⁴² Paul Salem 'Reflections on Lebanon's Foreign Policy', in: Collings, Deirdre (ed.), *Peace for Lebanon? From War to Reconstruction*, Lynn Rienner, Colorado, 1994, pp. 69–82.

⁴³ Ghassan Salamé, 'Is a Lebanese Foreign Policy Possible?', in: Halim Barakat (ed.), *Toward a Viable Lebanon*, Routledge, London, 1987, p. 347.

⁴⁴ Eitan Azani, *Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God*, op. cit., p. 200.

⁴⁵ Anouzla, Ali, "Why are the summits in Mecca being held?", Middle East Monitor. Available from <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20190530-why-are-the-summits-in-mecca-being-held/> (accessed 4 August 2019).

⁴⁶ Al Jazeera Arabic, *The Urgent Arab Summit Refuses Iran "Intervention" and Iraq objects*. Available from: <https://www.aljazeera.net/news/politics/2019/5/31/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9> (accessed 4 August 2019).

The meetings came at a stage of major regional transformations where the ongoing war in Yemen is escalating and the tension rises between Iran and United States. Prime Minister Saad Hariri wanted the Lebanese government's position to be in line with that of the Arabs. He intended not to consider the division in the Lebanese government for the following reasons. First, the official Lebanese position cannot be extraneous to Arab or international legitimacy. Second, if Lebanon distanced itself from the Arab distress, the Arab countries could reciprocate. Lebanon cannot afford the Arab distancing financially, politically, and economically. Third, the statement from the Mecca summit did not mention Hezbollah in any way. Fourth, Hezbollah is not entitled to criticize the position of the Lebanese government, while carrying military operations in the region. Hezbollah, through its acting in Syria, Yemen and Bahrain, is exposing Lebanon to danger.

Therefore, Hezbollah wants to be a partner in the government in everything related to the country's internal affairs, while it pursues its independent foreign policy and armed role. It requires the government to distance itself from what is stated in the preamble of the constitution regarding Lebanon's links with the Arabs, while it links itself to Iran.⁴⁷

Lebanon is living a duality between state and revolution. The solution is to separate the position of Hezbollah from that of the government. The views of Hezbollah do not reflect Lebanon's official stand in line with the Lebanese constitution and spirit. Hezbollah does not adhere to Lebanon's foreign policy. Thus, the government is not concerned with Hezbollah's position on the external crisis, and the limits of its relationship with Hezbollah does not extend beyond internal political life.⁴⁸

Hezbollah's Response

Hezbollah did not agree with the official Lebanese position during the last Arab League summit, and this was not a precedent. Hezbollah, on several occasions, denounced the Lebanese foreign policies. According to Hezbollah, the official Lebanese stand does not represent all the Lebanese, and it only conveys the position of those of the prime minister's party. Hezbollah's reaction regarding the last Arab League in Mecca came to follow the same line.

Nasrallah said: "Hezbollah, as a party involved in the government, considers that the position of the official Lebanese delegation to the Arab summit is not consistent with the ministerial statement. The Lebanese government's pledges are unacceptable, condemnable and do not represent Lebanon, won-

⁴⁷ Al-Jumhuriya, *Nasrallah Attacks "Teheran's Government" in Lebanon*, Available from: <https://www.aljournhouria.com/news/index/473897> (accessed 24 July 2019).

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

dering where the policy of neutrality and self-distance is."⁴⁹ He continued by addressing Hariri: "You are not required to speak like the Iraqi President. However, you could have said that the government distant itself and refused to vote, as it was done in previous summits."⁵⁰ Nasrallah added that "King's Salman request for Arab, Islamic, and Gulf summits looks like he is saying: 'please you Arabs, save me'. For all those who condemned the campaign of the aircraft on the oil targets in Saudi Arabia, I ask them to reconsider themselves, morally."⁵¹

Moreover, he mentioned Iran in his speech as the one who "helped Iraq against ISIS, helped Syria in its darkest days, and stood with the resistance in Lebanon and Palestine."⁵² Adding that "the focus on Iran is because they believe that it besieges will weaken the entire axis of resistance in the region."⁵³ On the other hand, he claimed that "We have no problem with the demarcation of the border, and we stand behind the state. Nevertheless, Washington wants to exploit the border demarcation negotiations to open up the issue of precision rockets aimed at Israel."⁵⁴

CONCLUSION

This paper aimed to observe how Hezbollah's ideologies recount to its practical conduct regarding the party's behavior to the official Lebanese foreign policy position.

All the logic of neutrality that formed the pillars of the 1943 Charter is based on the idea of not involving Lebanon in the conflicts abroad. However, when it comes to Hezbollah's pursuing its ideological target, Lebanon as a national entity is not in the party's interest. Participating in the Lebanese political system is only a mean for maintaining its hegemony and securing its national and regional presence. Therefore, Hezbollah in the aim of reaching its ultimate target, which is in line with that of the Islamic Republic of Iran

⁴⁹ New TV, *Nasrallah: Lebanon's position in the Arab Summit disagree with the government's guide*. Available from: <https://www.aljadeed.tv/arabic/news/local/3105201994> (accessed 24 July 2019).

⁵⁰ Al-Jumhuriya, op. cit.

⁵¹ Moqawama Al-Islamiya, official website, video gallery, 31 May 2019 (accessed 15 June 2019) <https://video.moqawama.org/details.php?cid=1&linkid=2052>

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

and its supreme leader inclines towards pragmatism and alteration of specific policies.

Nonetheless, Hezbollah not only opposes the government but also practice its own foreign and military policy in the region. All this away from that of the Lebanese regime even at the expense of Lebanon. Hence, according to Hezbollah, *Lebanonization* does not mean its total integration within the Lebanese political system. It means benefiting from the system and the protection that Lebanon as a country can provide while keeping its segregated agenda.

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SEGREGACIJA I/ILI INTEGRACIJA HEZBOLAH
 KAO NEDRŽAVNOG AKTERA U BORBI PROTIV
 REGIONALNE POLITIKE LIBANSKE VLADE

Apstrakt

Položaj šiita pre libanskog građanskog rata znatno se razlikuje od onog nakon njega. Tokom rata ovi su transformisani iz marginalizovane grupe u značajne „igrače” na libanskoj i regionalnoj političkoj sceni. Razlog trenutnog osnaživanja šiita leži u pojavi Hezbolaha koga podržava Iran. Odnos Hezbolaha i libanske vlade određen je kontroverznim regionalnim pitanjima.

Cilj rada je da se istraži ideologija Hezbolaha i takozvana libanizacija a u vezi sa spoljnom politikom Libana. Autor u radu pokazuje da je Hezbolah racionalan nedržavni akter koji je deo regionalne komparativne dinamike i borbe za vlast. Autor nalazi da je Hezbolah pragmatični ideološki akter koji igra i na kartu integracije i na kartu segregacije. Integracija obezbeđuje utočište Hezbolahu, dok mu segregacija omogućava da sledi svoju regionalnu agendu. U ispitivanju Hezbolahove ideologije, upravljanja i spoljne politike koristi se metoda analize diskursa.

Ključne reči:

iranska pitanja, Hezbolah, spoljna politika nedržavnog aktera, regionalni kompleks, konkurencija na Bliskom istoku, arapski sukobi, ideologija.